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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
EUGENE L. ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN W. ANDERSON, 




Sugarhouse Finance Company, plaintiff-appellant, re-
spectfully petitions this Court for a rehearing of the decision 
in the above referenced matter filed April 15, 1980. 
The issue before this Court on appeal was the validity 
and enforceability of an alleged accord and satisfaction to a 
judgment entered in favor of appellant in 1976. In an opinion 
by Justice Hall, the Court held: 
(a} Defendant's petition for judicial relief from 
plaintiff's judgment was procedurally proper and pro-
perly placed the issue before the trial court; 
(b} the accord and satisfaction was supported by 
adequate consideration; and 
(c} defendant's failure to state that he owned 
property located in Sevier County and failed to dis-
close the sale of a portion thereof did not render the 
accord and satisfaction voidable by reason of fraudu-
lent inducement. 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing addresses the Court's hold-
ing with respect to (b} and (c} above only. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 7, 1976, plaintiff filed a complaint against 
defendant for non-payment of a promissory note. Judgment there-
on was rendered in favor of plain ti ff on December 17, 1976, in 
the amount of $2,423.86, plus interest, costs, and attorney's 
fees. A copy of the judgment was docketed by plaintiff in 
Sevier County, defendants' county of residence. 
On January 29, 1979, plaintiff served defendants witl 
an Order in Supplemental Proceedings, ordering them to appear 
in court on February 29, 1979, and answer questions concerni~ 
their property. A few days after receiving this notice, def~­
dant Eugene Anderson (hereafter "defendant") met with the Pres-
ident of sugarhouse Finance Company to settle the judgment pre-
viously entered. Defendant Eugene Anderson informed plaintiff 
of the existence of numerous outstanding obligations against 
him, including medical expenses incurred pursuant to treatment 
for injuries sustained in an autoll'K)bile accident in 1978. De-
fendant asserted that he was contemplating bankruptcy and such 
a measure would result in plaintiff's judgment being discharged 
(Supreme Court opinion, p. 1). After some discussion about 
defendants' ability to pay the amount due and owing on the 
judgment, Neuman C. Petty, acting for the plaintiff, agreed to 
accept the sum of $2,200 in full settlement and satisfaction of 
the amount remaining to be paid on the judgment (Finding 4 of 
the Trial Court, R. 90). Defendant Eugene L. Anderson then 
made and delivered his check in the sum of $2,200 to said Neu-
man C. Petty as full payment of the settlement amount. The 
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check was drawn on Zions First National Bank, Salina, Utah, and 
the purpose of payment was stated on the check in the following 
language: "Payment in full judgment civil #236207" (Finding s 
of the Trial Court, R. 90). Defendant issued a check for this 
amount, asking plaintiff, however, not to negotiate it imme-
diately, there being some uncertainty as to the sufficiency of 
funds in the account to cover it (Supreme Court opinion, p. 1). 
At the time the defendant Eugene Anderson was served 
with the Supplemental Order, he was anticipating the closing of 
a sale of real property in which he had a one-half interest and 
from which he was to receive $2,000 after payment of the under-
lying indebtedness (Finding 6 of the Trial Court, R. 91). The 
sale was actually completed before Eugene Anderson met with 
plaintiff, and the title company had not disbursed any money to 
defendants because of plaintiff's judgment (Tr. 16, 17 and 18). 
Defendant Eugene L. Anderson knew that plaintiff's 
judgment had been docketed as a judgment lien upon all real 
property belonging to defendants in which defendants had an 
interest in Sevier County (Finding 7 of the Trial Court, R. 
91). Defendant Eugene L. Anderson did not disclose to Presi-
dent of plaintiff the fact that he had an interest in property, 
that the property had been sold, and that he was anticipating 
the closing of the sale of property and was to receive the sum 
of $2,000 from the sale (Finding 8 of the Trial Court, R. 91). 
Subsequent to these negotiations, plaintiff received a 
telephone call from a title company indicating that defendant 
was in the process of selling a parcel of real property (R. 
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116). The title company requested a release from the Sugar-
house Finance Company judgment (R. 116). Plaintiff declined to 
provide the title company with the requested release (R. 116). 
On the morning of February 2, 1979, Sugarhouse re-
turned the check for $2,200.00 to defendant by mail (R. 91, 
116). Later that same date, defendant telephoned Sugarhouse 
(R. 91, 115-116). Plaintiff informed defendant that his check 
had been returned and that Sugarhouse would not accept the 
check as settlement of the judgment as defendant had not be~ 
candid with him regarding defendant's financial status during 
their settlement negotiations (R. 91, 100, 111, 117). Defen-
dant received the check by mail on February 3, 1979 (R. 38). 
Defendant thereafter filed a motion in the original 
action, asking that the court order plaintiff to comply with 
the terms of the agreement of settlement. Hearing on the mo-
tion was convened on March 13, 1979, at the conclusion of which 
the motion was granted and the plaintiff was ordered upon re-
ceipt of the $2, 200 payment, to file a satisfaction of judgment 
with the court. It is from this order that plaintiff appealed. 
POINT I. THIS COURT HAS IMPROPERLY SUBSTITUTED ITS 
FINDINGS FOR THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
A. The Trial Court Made No Finding Of A Loan. 
The trial court made no finding that defendants had 
negotiated a loan and that such loan was the source of funds ~ 
be paid plaintiff. The trial court's findings regarding the 
check delivered to plaintiff were (1) that "defendant then re-
quested that Mr. Petty retain the check for two days while he 
( 4) 
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made arrangements for the check to clear the bank," and (2) 
"two days later ... defendant notified Neuman c. Petty by tele-
phone that arrangements had been made for the check to clear 
the bank" (Findings 10 and 11, R. 91). The trial court's find-
ings did not include findings as to the "arrangements," whether 
from the defendants' own funds or from some other source. 
This Court is required to defer to the findings of the 
fact finder rather than substitute its judgment. Carnesecca v. 
Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). 
In contrast to the findings of the trial court, this 
C our t s ta t ed : 
Pursuant to the parties' conversation of January 31, 
1979, defendant agreed that, for a release of the 
judgment upon payment of a lesser agreed amount, he 
would negotiate a loan with a third party to enable 
him to pay off the substitute obligation immediately. 
(Supreme Court opinion, p. 4., emphasis added.) 
We note that, in the present case, defendant agreed to 
incur additional indebtedness pursuant to the terms of 
the accord, in reliance on plaintiff's promise to 
accept immediate payment of a lesser amount in full 
satisfaction of the underlying obligation. (Supreme 
Court op in ion, p. 5., emphasis added.) 
The foregoing findings are inconsistent with those of the trial 
court. As such, this Court has substituted its judgment for 
findings of the trial court, the finder of fact. This is 
error. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, supra. 
Rules of appellate review also require this Court to 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the success-
ful party at the trial court. There is evidence in the record 
to the effect that Eugene Anderson, after his conversation with 
( 5.) 
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plaintiff, discussed with Zions First National Bank honoring 
defendant's check issued to plaintiff (Tr. 5, 13-14, 20; see 
Appendix A). This evidence was not reduced to any finding by 
the trial court. However, if this Court may consider this evj. 
dence, it clearly shows that no loan was made to the defen-
dant. Thus the consideration relied upon by this Court in i~ 
opinion has failed. The evidence, viewed in the light rrost 
favorable to defendants, shows the arrangements made by defen-
dant with Zions National Bank were that the bank would honor 
defendant's check when it was presented for payment. Had the 
check been presented for payment, the bank would have made a 
loan to defendants. However, the check was never presented to 
the bank for payment and therefore no loan was ever made to 
defendants. Thus the supposed consideration to support the 
accord and satisfaction failed. 
B. The Trial Court Made No Finding That Defendants 
Agreed To Obtain A Loan. 
The parties agreed that plaintiff would accept the surr 
of $2, 200 in full settlement and satisfaction of the judgment, 
whereupon defendant made and delivered his check in said sum 
(Findings 5 and 6, R. 90). The agreement was for defendants tc 
pay what they were already legally obligated to pay plaintiff, 
which does not constitute new or adequate consideration. Cor· 
bin on Contracts, §§175 and 1281. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any finding by the 
trial court of an agreement to obtain a loan, this Court in it5 
opinion at least twice referred to such an agreement. See 
(6) 
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Point I.A, above. This Court should not now find what the 
trial court did not find. 
By the findings of the trial court the defendants 
agreed only to do what they were already obligated to do. No 
new consideration was given. The agreement was not binding on 
plaintiff since not supported by new or adequate consideration. 
Even if the agreement were that defendant would obtain 
a loan from the bank, defendant did not fulfill the promise or 
agreement because defendant, at roost, arranged for the bank to 
honor his check when presented for payment. The check was 
never presented; thus, the loan was never made. 
C. The Trial Court Made No Finding Of Detriment Or 
Injustice To The Defendants. 
In its opinion, this Court relies on Section 90 of the 
Restatement of Contracts which is as follows: 
A promise which the promissor should reasonably expect 
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promissee and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise. 
There is no evidence to support a finding of detriment 
or injustice to the defendants. Defendants suffered no legal 
detriment since no loan was ever made to them by the bank. 
Enforcement of the promise, however, under such circumstances, 
rather than avoiding injustice to the defendants, results in 
injustice to plaintiff. Illustration 4 of Section 90 of Re-
statement of Contracts is illustrative: 
( 7) 
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A promises B $5,000, knowing that B desires thats~ 
for the purchase of Blackacre. Induced thereby, 8 
secures without any payment an option to buy Black-
acre. A then tells B that he withdraws his promise. 
A's promise is not binding. 
This illustration could be placed in the context of the pres~t 
case as follows: 
Plaintiff promises defendant to accept $2, 200 from 
defendant as full satisfaction for plaintiff's judg-
ment against defendant which exceeds $4,000 with in-
terest, attorney's fees and costs. Induced there~, 
defendant issues a check for $2,200 which defendant 
informs plaintiff will not be honored upon presentment 
until defendant advises plaintiff otherwise. Defen-
dant obtains an agreement from the bank upon which the 
check is drawn to honor the check. Plaintiff then 
tells defendant that the promise is withdrawn. Plain· 
tiff's promise is not binding. 
Defendant has suffered no detriment. Defendant is not indebted 
to the bank. Defendant remains in precisely the same position 
he was in before he met with plaintiff and before he obta~~ 
the bank's commitment to honor the check. 
Since the trial court made no finding of detriment and 
since there is no evidence to support such a finding, the 
agreement was not supported by consideration. This Court 
should so hold. 
POINT II. THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION WAS ON DEFENDANTS; THIS COURT 
PLACED THE BURDEN ON PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff submits that the burden of proving an accord 
and satisfaction is on the party claiming it. Rule 8, u.R.c.P. 
A sufficient defense thereto is a showing that it was not 
entered into fairly and honestly. 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and 
Satisfaction, §24 at 322-23, citing Ralph A. Badger & co. v. 
(8) 
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Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 
(1938). The burden of proof is stated: 
Accord and satisfaction is properly an affirma-
tive defense; it must be specifically pleaded and the 
burden of proof with respect to every element of it is 
on the party alleging it as a defense. (A. Corbin, 
Co~bin on Contracts, §1280 at 134-5 (1962); footnote 
omitted.) 
Plaintiff submits that the burden of establishing an accord and 
satisfaction was upon the defendant and that the Trial Court's 
findings, especially 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, conclusively establish 
that the accord and satisfaction was not consummated fairly and 
honestly. Instead, this Court has placed upon plaintiff the 
burden of establishing fraud. Although that issue is discussed 
in Points III and IV, plaintiff submits that is an improper 
burden for plaintiff in this case and this Court's analysis, 
relieving defendants of the burden which is theirs, is erro-
neous. 
POINT III. DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
THAT THE TITLE COMPANY WAS HOLDING MONEY PENDING 
THE RESOLUTION OF PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT. 
A. The Particular Circumstances in this Case Imposed 
Upon Defendant a Duty to Speak. 
Defendant Eugene L. Anderson was served with a motion 
and order in Supplemental Proceedings requiring him to person-
ally appear before the Trial Court on February 20, 1979. As 
such, he was under court order to appear and testify regarding 
his property. Defendant Anderson was anticipating the closing 
of a sale of real property in which he had a one-half interest 
as a tenant in common, and from which he was to receive $2,000 
( 9) 
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after payment of the underlying indebtedness (Finding 6, R. 
·90). Defendant knew that plaintiff's judgment had been docket-
ed as a judgment lien upon all real property belonging to de-
fendants or in which they had an interest in Sevier County 
(Finding 7, R. 90). The purchase pr ice for the property had 
actually been received by the title company, and the amount 
required to obtain a conveyance of the property being sold from 
a larger parcel which defendant was purchasing had been paid. 
The $2,000 that was to be the defendant's share from the sale 
was being held by the title company because of plaintiff's 
judgment (Tr. 17, 19). In that sense, the money being held 
actually belonged to plaintiff, or at least plaintiff had a 
claim upon it, as a result of its judgment lien. 
To be valid, a contract of accord and satisfaction 
must have been consummated fairly and honestly. 1 Am.Jur.2d 
Accord and Satisfaction § 24 at 322-323, citing Ralph A. Badger 
& Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n., 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 
669 (Utah 1938). The agreement defendants seek to hold plain-
tiff to was not consummated fairly and honestly. Defendant was 
not only in a superior position to know, but actually knew, the 
facts which would have a direct bearing on plaintiff's agree-
ment with defendants, and defendant did not disclose the facts. 
Because defendant knew the title company was holding 
money because of plaintiff's judgment lien, defendant had a 
duty to disclose such fact to plaintiff, which defendant knew 
was without knowledge of such fact. 
(10) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Where the particular circu~stances impose on a person 
a duty to speak and he deliberately remains silent 
his silence is equivalent to a false representatio~. 
37 C.J.S. Fraud §16a. 
The circumstances which impose on a person a duty to 
speak may arise in a business transaction, where parties are 
dealing at arms-length. For example, in Obde v. Schlemeyer, 
353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960), plaintiffs initiated an action to 
recover damages for the alleged fraudulent concealment of 
termite infestation in an apartment house purchased by them 
from the defendants. The trial court found the building was 
infested at the time of purchase, that defendants were ap-
prised of the termite condition but did not disclose the con-
dition to plaintiffs. On appeal the defendants urged that they 
had no duty to inform the plaintiffs of the termite condition. 
The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that the parties were 
dealing at arms-length, but nonetheless found, under the cir-
cumstances, a duty to disclose the condition. The Court reach-
ed this result even though the evidence showed that the pur-
chasers asked no questions respecting the possibility of ter-
mites. 
Similarly, in Sorrel v. Young, 491 P.2d 1312 (Wash. 
App. 1971), relying on a standard of "justice, equity and 
fair-dealing," attributed to Obde v. Schlemeyer, the Court held 
fraud by non-disclosure of the existence of a land fill where: 
(1) A vendor, knowing that the land has been filled, 
fails to disclose that fact to a purchaser of the.pro-
perty, and (2) the purchaser is unaware of the exis-
tence of the fill because either he has had no oppor-
(11) 
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tunity to inspect the property, or the existence of 
the fill is not apparent or readily ascertainable a. 
(3) the value of the property is materially affectednc 
by the existence of the fill. 
Of note is the fact that the buyer made no inquiry concerning 
the fill. See also Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 
1966), (non-disclosure of known defects in the construction of 
a home). 
Defendant's duty to disclose also arises because of 
the Order in Supplemental Proceedings. Defendant was under 
court order to appear and testify under oath regarding this 
property. Defendant knew he would be required to testify re-
garding his property, including the fact of the sale. There 
can be no dispute that the disclosure of the property and the 
sale of a portion thereof would have had an effect on plain-
tiff's willingness to enter into an agreement to accept less 
than defendants owed. In effect, defendant withheld or con-
cealed the facts to reach a settlement with plaintiff so he 
would not have to appear for the Order in Supplemental Pro~ed-
ings. This is an affront on the power of the trial court, 
which should not be condoned. 
B. Having Made Representations, Defendant was Under' 
Duty to Reveal, Fully and Fairly, the Facts. 
The trial court found: 
After some discussion about defendants' ability to~ 
the amount due and owing on the judgment, the [plain· 1, 
tiff's president], acting for the plaintiff, agreed.to I 
accept the sum of $2,200 in full settlement and satis- I 
faction of the amount remaining to be paid on the · 
judgment. (Finding 4, R. 90, emphasis added.) · 
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However, defendant: 
... did not disclose to president of plaintiff the 
fact that he had an interest in the property, that the 
property had been sold, and that he was anticipating 
the closing of the sale of property and that defendant 
Eugene L. Anderson was to receive the sum of $2,000 
from the sale thereof. (Finding 8, R. 91.) 
In Russ v. Brown, 529 P.2d 765 (Idaho 1974), the court 
stated the widely accepted rule that in the sale of property, 
"although one may not be required to make representations re-
garding his property, once undertaking to do so, he must fully 
disclose." Having discussed water-rights with their prospec-
tive buyers, the sellers were obligated to reveal, fully and 
fairly, all facts to the prospective purchasers, including past 
and pending water disputes with an adjoining land owner and his 
predecessors. This rule is stated at 37 C.J.S. Fraud §16c: 
Where one person seeks information from another, the 
latter may either refuse to give any information or he 
must make a full and truthful disclosure which shall 
have no tendency to deceive or mislead. One who con-
veys a false impression by the disclosure of some 
facts and the concealment of others is guilty of 
fraud, although his statement is true as far as it 
goes. (Emphasis added.) 
There is little question that the plaintiff was seek-
ing information from defendant. They discussed his financial 
situation for an hour-and-a-half. He indicated he was consid-
ering bankruptcy. He told plaintiff of his medical expenses. 
The trial court found plaintiff and defendant discussed "defen-
dants' ability to pay the amount due and owing on the judgment 
... " (Finding 4, R. 90). This alone required defendant to 
give a complete disclosure of his financial condition, includ-
(13) 
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ing the $2,000 he was expecting. In view of defendants' inter-
est in the property, which had ripened into money which was oot 
being disbursed to defendants because of plaintiff's judgment, 
defendant was under an obligation to make a full and truthful 
disclosure, including the ownership of property, the sale 
thereof and the fact that money was being withheld from defen-
dant because of plaintiff's judgment lien. 
In Deardorf v. Rosenbuch, 206 P.2d 996 (Okla. 1949), 
plaintiff purchased a one-acre mineral interest which was un-
developed. She was subsequently approached for the conveyan~ 
of her interest for a nominal sum, without the disclosure that 
upon the premises there was one producing oil well and two 
others were being drilled. Although plaintiff was without 
knowledge of the producing oil wells upon the property, defen-
dants contended they said nothing to mislead plaintiff and she 
made the sale of her own free will in an arms-length transac-
tion. Al though the negotiations were carried on by correspon· 
dence, the wells were clearly open to the view of anyone in-
specting the premises. The Court stated: 
In the opinion of this Court to confirm as true an-
others false impression concerning a material fact is 
no less a false representation of such fact as if made 
directly in order to create the false impression. The 
fact that there was production was the moving cause of 
defendant's seeking the conveyance. The absence of 
plaintiff's knowledge was relied on as an inducement 
to plaintiff's executing the conveyance for a nominal 
consideration. There is no need to weigh the value of 
each of the several statements in the letter when it 
is manifest that the letter as a whole is expressive 
of a scheme to capitalize on the ignorance of another. 
(14) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. Defendant Had a Duty to Speak Because the Facts 
were Not Equally Knowable to Both Parties. 
An arms-length transaction does not eliminate a par-
ty's duty, under certain circumstances, to disclose known facts 
to the other party: 
Where the parties deal at arms-length, there is no 
duty of disclosure where the facts are equally within 
the means of knowledge of both parties. If a fact is 
peculiarly within the knowledge of one party and of 
such a nature that the other party is justified in 
assuming its non-existence, there is a duty of dis-
closure. Although there is authority to the effect 
that knowledge that another is acting under a mis-
apprehension of fact does not impose a duty to speak, 
it is generally held that a deliberate failure to 
correct a delusion may constitute fraud. 37 C.J.S., 
Fraud §l6b. 
This Court cites the foregoing rule to the effect that where 
the facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both parties 
there is no duty of disclosure. The_ rule, accurately quoted, 
is slightly different: 
Where the facts are equally within the means and 
knowledge of both parties, there is no duty of 
disclosure. (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case, the facts were not equally within the 
means of knowledge of both parties, the plaintiff having no way 
of ascertaining the sale of plaintiff's property and the fact 
that the title company was withholding money from defendants 
because of plaintiff's lien. 
In Elder v. Clausen, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963), the 
defendant sold to plaintiffs a farm which had been quarantined 
for a noxious weed. Defendant showed the weed to plaintiffs, 
advising plaintiffs that the weed ought to be sprayed, but at 
no time did defendant advise plaintiffs of the quarantine. 
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This Court stated: 
We conclude that here there was a suppression of the 
truth, which the party with superior knowledge had a 
duty to disclose, which amounted to fraud.l 
lThe Court cited the following authority in support of 
this view: 
"One of the fundamental tenets of the Anglo-American 
law of fraud is that fraud may be committed by the suppression 
of the truth * * * as well as the suggestion of falsehood * * • 
*." 
"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must 
relate to a material matter known to the party and which it is 
his legal duty to communicate to the other contracting party, 
whether the duty arises from a relation of trust, from confi-
dence, inequality of condition and knowledge, or other atten-
dant circumstances * * *." 
"The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it re-
lates to nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is maintainable 
where a party who knows material facts is under a duty, under 
the circumstances, to speak and disclose his information, but 
remains silent * *." 
"Al though the pertinent inquiry in any case where 
fraud on the basis of nondisclosure is asserted is whether, 
upon any particular occasion, it was the duty of the person~ 
speak on pain of being guilty of a fraud by reason of his si-
lence, except in broad terms the law does not attempt to define 
the occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the contrary, 
there has been adopted, as a leading principle, the proposition 
that whether a duty to speak exists is determinable by refer-
ence to all the circumstances of the case and by comparing the 
facts not disclosed with the object and end in view by the con-
tracting parties. The difficulty is not so much in stating ~e, 
general principles of law, which are pretty well understood, u 
in applying the law to particular groups of facts * * *." 
"Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated 
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain 
facts is a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is 
owing. There is much authority to the effect that if one party 
to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or know-
ledge which is not within the fair and rasonable reach of the 
other party and which he could not discover by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which· are not open 
to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak, 
and his silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other 
party relies upon him to communicate to him the true state of 
facts to enable him to judge of the expediency of the bar-. i 
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In summary of the foregoing Points A, B and c of Point 
III, there are circumstances in business or arms-length trans-
actions where there is a duty of disclosure. In warner Con-
struction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 466 P.2d 996 (Cal. 
1970), the Supreme Court of California stated: 
In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or 
confidential relations, a cause of action for non-dis-
closure of material facts may arise in at least three 
instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but 
does not disclose facts which materially qualify the 
facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely 
to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only 
to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known 
to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) 
the defendant actively conceals discov~ry from the 
plaintiff. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Instances (1) and (2) clearly apply to the facts of this case. 
This Court should have found that defendants had a 
duty to disclose to plaintiff, and having breached the duty, 
plaintiff was entitled to rescind the agreement. 
POINT IV. DEFENDANTS STATEMENTS WERE MISLEADING 
AND MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS AND LAW; 
DEFENDANTS BANKRUPTCY WOULD NOT HAVE DISCHARGED 
PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT LIEN UPON THE REAL PROPERTY. 
In the course of the conversation between plaintiff 
and defendant regarding settlement of the judgment against de-
fendants, Eugene Anderson "asserted that he was contemplating 
bankruptcy, and that such a measure would result in plaintfff 's 
judgment being discharged." Plaintiff's judgment had been doc-
keted as a judgment lien upon all real property belonging to 
defendants or in which they had an interest in Sevier County. 
This was the only judgment lien docketed against defendant's 
real property. Defendants statement regarding the effect of 
(17) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bankruptcy upon plaintiff's judgment was erroneous. In terms 
of the bankruptcy law, plaintiff was a secured creditor, its 
claim secured by a judgment lien on defendant's real property. 
Bankruptcy would not discharge the judgment lien. See 11 
U.S.C. §§506 and 724. 
This clearly brings the defendant's statements with~ 
the rule stated in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 
(Utah 196 7) : 
Where one having a pecuniary interest in a transac-
tion, is in a superior position to know material 
facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a false 
representation concerning them, expecting the other 
party to rely and act thereon, and the other party 
reasonably does so and suffers loss in that transac-
tion, the represen tor can be held responsible if the 
other elements of fraud are also present. 
There is no question but that Anderson was in a superior posi-
tion to know the facts. He knew that plaintiff's judgment had 
been docketed as a judgment lien against his real property in 
Sevier County. His statement regarding the effect of bankrupt· 
cy was clearly made with the expectation that plaintiff would 
rely thereon and plaintiff did so rely. In making the state-
ment, Anderson was either careless or negligent. Plaintiff 
does not challenge the Court's observation that "the plaintiff 
is obligated to take reasonable steps to inform himself." 
Plaintiff submits however that plaintiff did so under the cir-
cumstances. Defendant Anderson travelled from Salina, Utah to 
Salt Lake City to resolve the matter of plaintiff's judgment. 
He told plaintiff about his financial condition. He told 
plaintiff he was contemplating bankruptcy. Plaintiff and 
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defendant discussed the matter for an hour-and-a-half. As 
stated in Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952): 
The full measure of the plaintiffs' duty was to use 
reasonable care and observation in connection with 
these representations. Having done so, it does not 
lie in defendant's mouth to say that they were too 
gullible and shouldn't have believed him. 
Plaintiff exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. 
Defendant's statement regarding the bankruptcy was false and 
misleading. 
Even if defendant's misstatement were innocently made, 
the contract resulting therefrom is voidable by plaintiff. In 
Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1941), Justice Traynor for 
the California Supreme Court stated the following rules: 
If . . . the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents 
the facts upon which it is based or implies the exis-
tence of facts which are none xis tent, it cons ti tu tes 
an actionable misrepresentation . . . The fact that 
an investigation would have revealed the falsity of 
the misrepresentation will not alone bar his recovery 
... and it is well established that he is not held 
to constructive notice of a public record which would 
reveal the true facts. 115 P.2d at 980. 
If plaintiff's president knew that a judgment lien on 
real property is not discharged by bankruptcy, defendant's 
statement would mean to plaintiff that defendant owned no real 
property subject to the judgment lien. If plaintiff did not 
know that a judgment lien on real property is not discharged by 
bankruptcy, defendant's statement would mean that all debts, 
including judgments and judgment liens would be discharged. In 
either event, the statement was misleading, even if innocently. 
This Court should have held the defendant's statements 
were misleading and that plaintiff was entitled to rescind or 
void the agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
· The facts as found by the trial court and the eviden~ 
before the trial court and this Court require findings and 
judgment that: 
(lJ Defendant's agreement to pay $2,200 in full satis-
faction of plaintiff's judgment was not supported by new con-
sideration to support an accord and satisfaction. 
(2) Defendants had a duty to disclose to plaintiff their 
interest in real property, that a portion thereof had been 
sold, and that the proceeds which would otherwise be paid to 
defendants were being held by the title company because of 
plaintiff's judgment. 
(3) The representations made by defendant were misleading; 
plaintiff was entitled to rescind the agreement entered into 
based on the misleading statements. 
Based on the foregoing, Sugarhouse Finance Company 
prays for this Court to rehear this case and that this Court 
reverse the order of the trial court. 
DATED this~ day of May, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
( 20) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th _day of May, 1980, I 
served a copy of the attached Petition for Rehearing and Brief 
in Support of Petition for Rehearing by delivering a copy 
thereof to the following, or by mailing a copy thereof in a 
securely sealed, postage paid envelope to the following at the 
address indicated: 
H. Ralph Klemm, Esq. 
Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX A 
Testimony of Eugene L. Anderson at the hearing before Judge 
Durham, March 13, 1979: 
Q [By Mr. Petty] What did you tell him [plaintiff's 
president] with respect to the status of your bank 
account and the amount of this check? 
A I told him that I would have to see to it that it 
would clear. 
Q Did you tell him that? 
A I told him that the guy that is the bank president 
down there is a friend of mine, and that we go 
square dancing with him, and that there would be 
no problem on the check. In fact, I have written 
checks previously without the funds to cover them, 
and they have always cleared the checks, you know, 
whether I have the funds in there or not. 
Q You did tell him, though, that at the time this 
check was written there weren't sufficient funds 
to cover the check? 
A That's correct. 
(Tr. 5.) 
Q [By Mr. Klemm] Mr. Anderson, will you tell us 
specifically what arrangements were made with the 
bank with regard to the $2200 check that was given 
to Mr. Petty? 
A I just told Rex that I may need some money and 
could he loan me some more money, and he said, "We 
will take care of it when you need it." And that's 
basically all it was. 
Q Did you have other arrangements as well with your 
friend at the bank in regards to checks that would 
come in that weren't covered by funds in the bank? 
A Never had an arrangement, but in three years--and 
I have written, I don't know, not too many, but 
several checks that the funds weren't in there--
but the bank has cleared every check. I have never 
had a check come back unpaid. 
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Q Did .you have an understanding with the bank in 
regards to that? 
A We had never talked about it. They just did that 
for me. 
(Tr. 13-14.) 
Q [By Mr. Petty) Now, with respect to the bank, and 
1 
the bank's honoring of this check, did you advise 
the bank that you had issued a check on your account1 
A All I did was--like I said, all I did was tell Rex 
that I may need some more money, and would it be 
possible to get another loan. And he says, "When 
you need it, we will take care of it." 
Q Did that mean you would have to go back in and talk 
to him again? 
A No. 
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